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Abstract
Innovative dynamics are an interesting class of evolutionary dynamics, which include
the Best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics (in short BNN)
and the Pairwise Difference dynamics (in short PD). Their models are more similar
to the behavior of rational players and while the BR dynamics requires the theory
of differential inclusions, the latter two dynamics fulfill also the conditions for the
existence and uniqueness theorem of ordinary differential equations. We classify the
behavior of these two dynamics for all 2× 2 bimatrix games. We will see that under
each dynamics every game has at least one reachable equilibrium and analyze stability
with Liapunov functions. Further we will prove the non-existence of periodic orbits
through Bendixson-Dulac.
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Innovative Dynamiken, wie die Best response Dynamik, die Brown-von Neumann-
Nash Dynamik und die Pairwise-Difference Dynamik sind eine interessante Klasse der
evolutiona¨ren Dynamiken. Ihre Modelle richten sich mehr nach dem Verhalten von ra-
tionalen Spielern und wa¨hrend die Best response Dynamik eine Differential Inklusion
ist, erfu¨llen die letzten beiden den Eindeutigkeitssatz fu¨r Gewo¨hnliche Differentialgle-
ichungen. Wir untersuchen das Verhalten dieser Dynamiken fu¨r alle 2 × 2 Bimatrix-
Spiele. Wir werden sehen, dass jedes Spiel zumindest ein erreichbares Gleichgewicht
hat und untersuchen die Stabilita¨t der Gleichgewichte mittels Liapunovfunktionen.
Weiters werden wir mittels Bendixson-Dulac zeigen, dass es keine periodischen Orbits
gibt.
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Introduction
The purpose of this work is to tackle two issues in Evolutionary Game Theory that
are not thoroughly researched but offer some quite interesting results. The first issue
are bimatrix games, among them the two most famous examples for degenerate games,
the Centipede Game and the Chain-Store Game. The second issue are two cases of
innovative dynamics, namely the Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics, throughout
shortened as BNN and the Pairwise Difference Dynamics, also known as Pairwise
Comparison Dynamics or Smith dynamics [16].
The 13 possible cases of generic and degenerate 2× 2 bimatrix games have been stud-
ied already by Cressman[9] and Hofbauer[12] for replicator dynamics and fictitious
play. Binmore[5] studies the problems of the Chain-Store Game and Centipede Game
in real life issues, such as entering a market competing with a rival or a drug deal,
which raises new questions on the change of dynamics by mutation and there’s also
the famous Chain Store Paradox by Selten[18]. Our work continues the tradition of
Zeeman[24] and Bomze[6] who studied all cases of the replicator dynamics for symmet-
rical games and Stejskal[21] for 2×2 Best-response dynamics. Little is known however
on the behavior of degenerate games under the BNN- and Pairwise Difference dynam-
ics, or, as a matter of fact, any innovative dynamics[23] for higher dimensional games
at all.
Historically, BNN has been used by both Brown and von Neumann[8] and Nash[15]
in the early days of Game Theory. Brown and von Neumann considered the special
case of symmetric two person zero sum games to show that for such games solutions
converge to the set of equilibria[3] and Nash used the dynamics in discrete times to
prove the existence of equilibria. Later on, Arrow and Debreu[1] used this Nash map
for an existence proof in General Equilibrium Theory.
The above mentioned examples from economic theory show the great benefit of the
BNN; while it is not a smooth dynamics, unlike the replicator equation, the right hand
side of it is Lipschitz and it fulfills the conditions for the existence and uniqueness the-
orem for differential equations[3], while the Best-Response dynamics is discontinuous
and requires the theoretical framework of differential inclusions.
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The Pairwise Difference dynamics is another innovative dynamics with similarities
to the BNN dynamics. It was introduced by M J Smith[20] for a traffic congestion
problem and later studied by Sandholm[16], [17] but otherwise, little attention has
been paid to it in mathematics or economics.
We will give a definition of innovative dynamics, then look at the 13 different classes
of generic and degenerate 2×2 games under the Pairwise Difference dynamics and the
BNN dynamics, focus on the differences and similarities between the two in terms of
dynamic behavior and Nash Equilibria and offer an outlook into future questions and
problems for further research.
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1. Innovative Dynamics
It might be a good start to give an introduction and theoretical framework on in-
novative dynamics and what they are all about. We take an n × m-game with two
players and mixed strategies x ∈ ∆n and y ∈ ∆m with x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn), where xi
denotes the frequency of pure strategy i for player 1, and y = (y1, y2, · · · , ym) with yj
respectively denoting the frequency of pure strategy j for player 2, and the respective
payoff matrices given by
A =

a11 a12 · · · a1m
a21 a22 · · · a2m
...
...
. . .
...
an1 an2 · · · anm
 B =

b11 b12 · · · b1n
b21 a22 · · · a2n
...
...
. . .
...
bm1 bm2 · · · bmn
 (1.1)
The payoff for the pure strategy i for player 1 and j of player 2 are given by
ai = (Ay)i =
m∑
k=1
aikyk bj = (Bx)j =
n∑
l=1
bjlxl
The average payoffs a¯ and b¯ are given by
a¯ =
n∑
i=1
xiai =
n∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
xiaikyk b¯ =
m∑
j=1
yjbj =
m∑
j=1
n∑
l=1
yjbjlxl
Dynamics for games can be divided into two groups, dynamics based on imitative
adaptation and dynamics based on innovative adaptation. To give a heuristic expla-
nation for the names, we might say that for imitative dynamics model agents imitate
existing strategies and hence only pure strategies ”known”, ”in use” or non-extinct
are played while innovative dynamics are just that, innovative, and model agents play
all pure strategies. Among imitative dynamics are the well known and thoroughly
researched dynamics, like the Replicator dynamics while for the innovative dynamics
we have the Best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and
Pairwise Difference dynamics.
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1. Innovative Dynamics
The division was first suggested by Weibull [23] and he also gives the following
definition of innovative dynamics, which we will also use here.
Definition 1.1. For the population dynamics
x˙i = fi(x, y) y˙j = gj(x, y) (1.2)
let Γ1(x, y) be the subset of Better than Average pure strategies of player 1, Γ1(x, y) =
{i : ai > a¯} and respectively Γ2(x, y) for player 2. We call the dynamics innovative if
its vector field satisfies the following axiom:
(IN): If Γ1(x, y) 6= ∅ then fi(x, y) > 0 for some i ∈ Γ1(x, y) and if Γ2(x, y) 6= 0 then
gj(x, y) > 0 for some j ∈ Γ2(x, y).
A corollary of this definition is the following property of innovative dynamics, which
is called Nash Stationarity by Sandholm[16].
Corollary 1.2. All rest points of innovative dynamics are equivalent to Nash Equi-
libria
Proof. Let us assume that we have a pair (x, y) ∈ ∆n×∆m that is a rest point but not
a Nash Equilibrium. Then x˙i = fi(x, y) = 0, y˙j = gj(x, y) = 0 by definition of a rest
point. For (x, y) not being a Nash Equilibrium, we have that either for player 1 ai > a¯
for some i or for player 2 bj > b¯ for some j. Therefore i ∈ Γ1(x, y)(or j ∈ Γ2(x, y))
and fi(x, y) > 0 (gj(x, y) > 0), which contradicts (x, y) being a rest point.
The Pairwise Difference dynamics, in short PD, is given by
x˙i =
n∑
k=1
xk(ai − ak)+ − xi
n∑
k=1
(ak − ai)+
y˙j =
m∑
l=1
yl(bj − bl)+ − yj
m∑
l=1
(bl − bj)+
(1.3)
As we can see, the name is self explanatory. Since it’s not obvious from the equa-
tion that the PD dynamics fulfills the requirements of the definition for innovative
dynamics, we will prove this in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.3. The PD dynamics satisfies axiom (IN).
Proof. Without loss of generality, let a1 ≤ a2 ≤ · · · ≤ an and let Γ1(x, y) 6= ∅, hence
at least an > a¯.
x˙i expanded is given by
x˙i = x1(ai−a1)+ +x2(ai−a2)+ + · · ·+xn(ai−an)+−xi [(a1 − ai)+ + · · ·+ (an − ai)+]
In particular
x˙n = x1(an−a1)++x2(an−a2)++· · ·+xn(an−an)+−xn [(a1 − an)+ + · · ·+ (an − an)+]
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Since an ≥ ai∀i with i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, this leads us to
x˙n = x1(an − a1) + x2(an − a2) + · · ·+ xn(an − an)
= x1an + x2an + · · ·+ xnan −
n∑
j=1
xjaj
Since
∑n
i=1 xi = 1,we are left with
x˙n = an −
n∑
j=1
xjaj = an − a¯ > 0
Analogously for player 2.
The BNN dynamics is given by
x˙i = αi − xi
n∑
k=1
αk
y˙j = βj − yj
m∑
l=1
βl
(1.4)
where αi = (ai − a¯)+ and βj = (bj − b¯)+.
Since, just like for the PD dynamics, the right hand side of the dynamics is Lipschitz,
it also fulfills the conditions for the existence and uniqueness theorem for differential
equations. As we will see, the dynamics satisfies (IN). However, the best strategy
does not always increase in BNN, therefore the proof is different.
Lemma 1.4. The BNN dynamics satisfies axiom (IN).
Proof. Suppose that Γ1(x, y) 6= ∅, but fi(x, y) ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ Γ1(x, y). Since for i /∈ Γ1(x, y),
ai ≤ a¯ and therefore fi(x, y) ≤ 0 and with
∑n
i=1 fi(x, y) = 0, we have that fi(x, y) =
0∀i.
This leads us to
x˙i = (ai − a¯)+ − xi
n∑
k=1
(ak − a¯)+ = 0
For x˙i to be 0, we require
(ai − a¯)+ = xi
n∑
k=1
(ak − a¯)+ (1.5)
If ai ≤ a¯ ∀i, then Γ1(x, y) = ∅ and we have a contradiction. Suppose now that
(ai − a¯) > 0 for some i, then
∑n
k=1(ak − a¯)+ > 0. We have that
0 =
n∑
i=1
xi(ai − a¯)
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which leads us by using (1.5) to ∑
i:ai>a¯
xi(ai − a¯)+
and since xi 6= 0 for i ∈ Γ1(x, y) and (ai − a¯) > 0 for all i ∈ Γ1(x, y) it is 6= 0 and
hence we have a contradiction.
Before we start, we will introduce a result which might look trivial at first but is of
great use later on.
Lemma 1.5. Adding a constant c to a column of a payoff matrix does not change the
BNN and PD dynamics.
Proof. We have the matrix
A′ =

a11 a12 · · · a1j + c · · · a1m
a21 a22 · · · a2j + c · · · a2m
...
...
. . .
...
...
an1 an2 · · · anj + c · · · anm

which is matrix A from (1.1)with a constant c added to the j-th column.
We have a′i =
∑m
k=1 a
′
ikyk =
∑m
k=1 aikyk + cyj = ai+ cyj and a¯
′ =
∑n
i=1
∑m
k=1 xia
′
ikyk =
a¯− cyj.
We can see that
a′i − a′k = ai − ak + cyj − cyj
a′i − a¯′ = ai − a¯+ cyj − cyj
Therefore, for the PD dynamics for the game (A′, B′),
x˙i =
m∑
k=1
xk(a
′
i − a′k)+ − xi
m∑
k=1
(a′k − a′i)+
⇒ x˙i =
m∑
k=1
xk(ai − ak)+ − xi
m∑
k=1
(ak − ai)+
Likewise for the BNN dynamics.
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2. The Pairwise Difference Dynamics
We now look at bimatrix games with two strategies. Without loss of generality, we
take for both PD- and BNN-dynamics the respective pay-off matrices
A =
(
0 a12
a21 0
)
B =
(
0 b12
b21 0
)
(2.1)
We may use these matrices since because of Lemma 1.5 we may add a constant to
each column without changing the dynamics and therefore we may transform every
2× 2 matrix into a matrix of the above form.
Since the strategy x2 = (1 − x1) and y2 = (1 − y1), it is enough to consider the
strategies x1 and y1 only. For x1 = x, x2 = (1 − x) and for y1 = y, y2 = (1 − y)
likewise, the equations (1.3) transform to
x˙ = (1− x)(a1 − a2)+ − x(a2 − a1)+
y˙ = (1− y)(b1 − b2)+ − y(b2 − b1)+
(2.2)
where (
a1
a2
)
=
(
0 a12
a21 0
)(
y
1− y
)
and (
b1
b2
)
=
(
0 b12
b21 0
)(
x
1− x
)
We use the terminology as in [12], which contains a similar discussion of the replicator
dynamics and the BR-dynamics.
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2. The Pairwise Difference Dynamics
2.1. The Four Cases of Generic Games
First we define a generic game for the 2× 2 case.
Definition 2.2. A bimatrix game (2.1) is called generic if no column of a payoff
matrix is all zero. (Alternative definition: In a generic game, the payoff of two different
strategies for one player is never equal.)
2.2.1. 0a and 0b
Figure 2.1.: 0a and 0b
The games (2.2) in case 0a are given by a12a21 < 0 and b12b21 > 0. For case 0b,
which includes the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, we have a12a21 < 0 and b12b21 < 0.
In short, the equations are for 0a
x˙ = (1− x)(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)
y˙ = (1− y)(b12 − (b12 + b21)x)+ − y(−b12 + (b12 + b21)x)+
and for 0b
x˙ = (1− x)(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)
y˙ = (1− y)(b12 − (b12 + b21)x)
In both cases strategy 1 for player 1 dominates strategy 2 and we have a unique strict
Nash Equilibrium and asymptotic stability for (1, 1).
2.2.2. 0c
The cyclic game 2×2 game 0c is also known as the ”Buyer-Seller game” or ”Matching
Pennies game”. We have a12a21 > 0, b12b21 > 0 and a12b12 < 0. We get the unique
equilibrium point E = ( b12
b12+b21
, a12
a12+a21
). For the equations (2.2) we study stability.
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2.1. The Four Cases of Generic Games
Figure 2.2.: 0c or Buyer-Seller
In order to prove stability, we will use a similar Liapunov function as the one from
[13], [16], [20] which is given for single population games by
V (x) =
1
2
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
xi [Fj(x)− Fi(x)]2+ (2.3)
where Fi(x) denotes the payoff of strategy i.
Proof of stability through Liapunov
The PD dynamics for the bimatrix game 0c is given by
x˙ = (1− x)(a1 − a2)+ − x(a2 − a1)+
y˙ = (1− y)(b1 − b2)+ − y(b2 − b1)+
(2.4)
The Liapunov function for the PD dynamics as written in [13], [16] and [20] for stable
games is given for a bimatrix game by the following equation (note that we need
different weights for different players):
V (x, y) = (b12 + b21)(x(a2 − a1)2+ + (1− x)(a1 − a2)2+)
− (a12 + a21)(y(b2 − b1)2+ + (1− y)(b1 − b2)2+)
(2.5)
We look at the Liapunov function in the first quadrant, that is where
x < x¯, y < y¯
and x˙ < 0 and y˙ > 0. In that region, V is given by
V = (b12 + b21)(x(a2 − a1)2)− (a12 + a21)((1− y)(b1 − b2)2)
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Therefore
V˙ = (b12 + b21)(a2 − a1)2x˙+ (a12 + a21)(b1 − b2)2y˙
+ 2(b12 + b21)(x(a2 − a1))(a2 − a1)• − 2(a12 + a21)((1− y)(b1 − b2)(b1 − b2)•)
and we have that
(b12 + b21)(x(a2 − a1))(a2 − a1)• − (a12 + a21)((1− y)(b1 − b2)(b1 − b2)•)
=(b12 + b21)(a12 + a21)x(a2 − a1)(1− y)(b1 − b2)
−(b12 + b21)(a12 + a21)((1− y)(b1 − b2))(x(a2 − a1))
= 0
and hence
V˙ = (b12 + b21)(a2 − a1)2x˙+ (a12 + a21)(b1 − b2)2y˙ < 0
for (x, y) 6= E. The same computation can be done for the other 3 quadrants with the
same result.
For the Liapunov function, ω(x, y) ⊆ {x¯, y¯} and therefore, by A.8 we have a globally
asymptotically stable Nash Equilibrium in E = (x¯, y¯). For different proofs regarding
the stability of the Nash Equilibrium, we refer to Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
2.2.3. 0d
Figure 2.3.: 0d or Battle of Sexes
Case 0d contains the ”Battle of the Sexes”, the ”Hawk and Dove” and the ”Owner-
Intruder game”. We have a12a21 > 0 and b12b21 > 0, however with a12b12 > 0 as well.
We get three rest points.
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2.3. One Degenerate Strategy
The two corners (1, 0) and (0, 1) are both strict Nash Equilibria and we also have the
interior equilibrium E = ( b12
b12+b21
, a12
a12+a21
). We use linearization around the equilibrium
E and get for the four quadrants four matrix of the form(
0 −
− 0
)
which leads to a positive and a negative eigenvalue in each quadrant. This suggests
that E is a saddle point. It will be interesting to know whether there is any orbit
leading to the Nash Equilibrium E. We will take the equations of the dynamics (2.2)
and compute the orbits. We will look at the left-bottom quadrant where x < x¯, x˙ > 0
and y < y¯, y˙ > 0
dx
dy
=
(1− x)(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)
(1− y)(b21 − (b12 + b21)x)
which leads us to
b21 − (b12 + b21)x
(1− x) dx =
a12 − (a12 + a21)y
1− y dy
and after integration to
b21 log(1− x)− (b12 + b21)(1− x) + C = a21 log(1− y)− (a12 + a21)(1− y).
By inserting x¯ and y¯ for (x, y), we get
b21 log(1− b12
b12 + b21
) + b21 + C = a21 log (1− a12
a12 + a21
)− a21
which leads to
C = a21 log (
a12
a12 + a21
)− a21 − b21 log (1− b12
b12 + b21
)− b21
= a21 log (
a12
a12 + a21
)− a21 − b21 log ( b21
b12 + b21
)− b21
hence
H(x, y) = b21 log(1− x)− (b12 + b21)(1− x)− a21 log(1− y) + (a12 + a21)(1− y) + C
is the unique orbit leading to E in the first quadrant. The same way, we will find out
that exactly one orbit from the third quadrant also leads to the equilibrium, while for
the second and fourth quadrant, we have exactly one orbit leading away from it in
each quadrant.
2.3. One Degenerate Strategy
There are 4 cases with 1 degenerate strategy, where 2 cases are pretty famous and
known as the Centipede Game and the Chain-Store Game. In each phase plot, the
degenerate edge is always colored, with red indicating Nash Equilibria and yellow the
non-equilibria.
21
2. The Pairwise Difference Dynamics
Figure 2.4.: 1a for PD
2.3.1. 1a
We have the case that a12 > 0, a21 < 0, b21 < 0, b12 = 0 which implies a2 > a1, b1 > b2.
This turns (2.2) into
x˙ = (1− x)(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)
y˙ = (1− y)(−b21x)
since −a12+(a12+a21)y ≤ 0 and equally −b12+(b12+b21)x ≤ 0. Hence, we have for the
Nash Equilibrium (1, 1) the Jacobi-Matrix
(
a21 0
0 b21
)
and therefore an asymptotically
stable equilibrium point. The degenerate strategy, strategy 2, is dominated for player
2, just as player 1’s strategy 2 is dominated. Further, if we take the Liapunov function
V (x, y) = x
defined on G = [0, 1]× [0, 1], we see that V˙ (x, y) > 0 ∀x 6= 1.
Therefore ω(x, y) ⊆ {x = 1} according to A.9. Since the only invariant set on x = 1
is the point (1, 1), according to A.8 (1, 1) is even globally asymptotically stable.
2.3.2. 1b
We have the case that a12 < 0, a21 > 0, b21 < 0, b12 = 0. Thus (2.2) is
x˙ = −x(−a12 + (a12 + a21)y)
y˙ = (1− y)(−b21x)
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Figure 2.5.: PD for 1b
The Nash Equilibria of this game are (0, yˆ) with yˆ ∈ [0, 1]. This leads to the Jacobian(−(−a12 + (a12 + a21)y) 0
∗ 0
)
equaling a negative eigenvalue and one eigenvalue 0 at each equilibrium point (0, yˆ).
By using
x˙
y˙
=
−a12 + (a12 + a21y)
(1− y)(−b21)
we get by separation of variables the level curves
H = −b21x+ a21 ln(1− y)− (a12 + a21)(1− y)
or
−b21x = −a21 ln(1− y) + (a12 + a21)(1− y) + C.
Hence, for x0 = 0 and y0 ∈ [0, 1], we have that
a21 ln(1− y0) = (a12 + a21)(1− y0) + C
which is solvable with regard to C, i.e.
C = a21 ln(1− y0)− (a12 + a21)(1− y0)
which solves the equation for x = 0. Therefore, we have an orbit leading to every
point on the degenerate edge, except for (0, 0), which is a minimum for H(x, y) and
we have a continuum of stable Nash equilibria given by (0, yˆ) with yˆ ∈ [0, 1].
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Figure 2.6.: Centipede Game 1c
2.3.3. 1c or Centipede Game
For the Centipede Game, we have that a12 < 0, a21 < 0, b12 > 0, b21 = 0. This turns
(2.2) to the form
x˙ = (1− x)(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)+ − x(−a12 + (a12 + a21y))+
y˙ = (1− y)(1− x)b12
We have for (1, yˆ) with yˆ ∈ [0, 1] a degenerate edge. By linearizing around x = 1 and
y > a12
a12+a21
we get the Jacobi matrix(−(a12 − (a12 + a21)y) 0
∗ 0
)
which leads to a matrix of the form (− 0
∗ 0
)
(2.6)
This leads to a negative eigenvalue and one eigenvalue 0 for (1, y > a12
a12+a21
). By
separation of variables, we get for y > a12
a12+a21
the level curves
H(x, y) = b12x− a12 log(1− y)− (a12 + a21) [(1− y)− log(1− y)]
= b12x− (2a12 + a21) log(1− y)− (a12 + a21)(1− y)
As we can see, there is a maximum for x = 1, while for y it is increasing for y → 1.
For x0 = 1 and y0 ∈
[
a12
a12+a21
, 1
]
we have
24
2.3. One Degenerate Strategy
Figure 2.7.: Plot of H(x,y) for 1c
C = b12 − a12 log(1− y0) + (a12 + a21) [(1− y0)− log(1− y0)]
and hence we have at least one orbit converging to each (1, yˆ), yˆ > a12
a12+a21
. Further
we have a continuum of stable equilibria for (1, yˆ), yˆ ≥ a12
a12+a21
.
Looking at the phase plane and the equations for the orbits, we can see that the
phase portrait is the same as the phase portrait of the simple SIR model from epidemi-
ology (see [7]). For y ≥ y¯ even the differential equations and hence the level curves
are equivalent, modulo some constants. Furthermore, the SIR model is a special case
of the classical Lotka-Volterra predator prey equation, where one species, the prey,
have no growth and hence this leads to the population of the prey minimizing but
the predators dying out. Likewise, for the SIR-model, the number of susceptibles does
not grow, which leads after an initial rise of the infected population to a fall and a
population of susceptible but non-infected individuals remaining.
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1d or Chain-Store Game
Figure 2.8.: 1d or Chain-Store Game
The only difference in the equation for the Chain-Store Game compared to the
Centipede Game lies with b12 < 0. Hence we get
x˙ = (1− x)(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)+ − x(−a12 + (a12 + a21y))+
y˙ = −y(1− x)b12
We have Nash Equilibria at (1, yˆ) with a12
a12+a21
≤ yˆ ≤ 1 and at (0, 0) a strict Nash
Equilibrium.
Therefore we need to look at two parts for stability. For (1, yˆ), yˆ > a12
a12+a21
we have
the same Jacobian matrix as above in 1c. Therefore we have a set of stable equilibria
for (1, yˆ). By separation of variables, we get the constant of motion for y > a12
a12+a21
H(x, y) = −b12x+ (a12 log y − (a12 + a21)y) = const
For x0 = 1 and y0 ∈
[
a12
a12+a21
, 1
]
we have
C = −b12 + (a12 log y0 − (a12 + a21)y0)
and hence we have interior orbits converging to each (1, yˆ), yˆ ≥ a12
a12+a21
. Further, we
have a continuum of stable equilibria for (1, yˆ), yˆ > a12
a12+a21
.
This leads to an interesting case by comparison with the centipede game, as for
the centipede game, we had that the Nash Equilibrium (1, a12
a12+a21
) was stable but not
reachable, while for the chain-store game, the equilibrium is reachable but not stable.
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Therefore we see that a reachable equilibrium does not need to be stable, while a
stable equilibrium does not need to be reachable.
For y < a12
a12+a21
, we have the Jacobian matrix(
a12 0
∗ b12
)
which has two negative eigenvalues and hence asymptotic stability for E = (0, 0).
2.3.4. A few remarks on the Centipede and Chain-Store Game
The Centipede Game and the Chain-Store Game are the two most famous cases of
degenerate 2× 2 games which arise from extensive-form games. Contrary to normal-
form games, the extensive-form allows explicit modeling of interactions and therefore,
each player has perfect information.
The Chain-Store Game was introduced by Reinhard Selten[18] and we will also use
his description of the game. We consider a fictitious market situation, where a chain
store called player A has branches in n towns, numbered from 1 to n. In each town,
there is a potential competitor who might raise money at a local bank and establish a
second shop of the same kind. The competitor at town k is called player k. Thus the
game has n + 1 players, the chain-store A and the players k, with k = 1, . . . , n. As
time goes on, each player will have saved enough to increase his owned capital to a
required amount to establish a second shop. As soon as the time comes up for player
k, he must decide whether he wants to establish a second shop, or whether he wants
to use the owned capital in a different way. If he chooses latter possibility, he stops
being a competitor of player A.
If a second shop is established in town k, then player A has to choose between two price
policies for town k. He may respond by being ’cooperative’ or ’aggressive’. Since the
game is played in a non-cooperative way, no binding contracts, cartels, commitments
and other issues are allowed.
player k’s player A’s player k’s player A’s
decision decision payoff partial payoff
period k for period k
IN COOPERATIVE 2 2
IN AGGRESSIVE 0 0
OUT - 1 5
Table 2.1.: Player A’s partial payoffs and player k’s payoff
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Figure 2.9.: Extensive Form of Chain-Store Game
Looking at the table, we can give the payoff matrix of the game the following way
P =
(
(5, 1) (5, 1)
(0, 0) (2, 2)
)
where player A’s payoff is indicated by the row and player k’s by the column. which
for the bimatrix game gives us the respective pay-offs
A =
(
5 5
0 2
)
BT =
(
1 1
0 2
)
As we can see, this game belongs to case 1d.
This game is played with the n other players too over n rounds. After each
round, player A’s decision is immediately made known to all other players and for
k = 1, . . . , n−1 period k+ 1 begins and is played accordingly. Player A’s payoff is the
sum of n partial payoffs for the periods 1, . . . , n. If we look at the game inductively,
then if in period n player n selects IN, then the best choice for player A is to cooper-
ate, since it yields a higher payoff. The strategic situation obviously does not depend
on the players’ decisions in previous periods.
Now, if we consider period n− 1, then similarly, if player n− 1 selects IN, then it is
again the best strategy for A to cooperate. This way we can conclude by induction
that each player k should choose IN and each time player A should cooperate. This
way, each player k receives a payoff of 2 and A a total payoff of 2n.
However, this does not really work that way in real life. In real life, player A can
receive a higher pay off by being deterrent. As an example, if player A in the first few
m rounds, with 1 < m < n behaves aggressively against competitors, this will scare off
his competitors in other towns from stepping into the market as for them no gain or a
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loss of money weighs much more than for player A, since for him this is just a partial
payoff while for player k in town k it is the whole payoff. As an example, if we take
n = 30 and m = 6 and from the remaining 24 towns, 5 competitors are not impressed
by player A’s bullying, then player A can still get a minimum payoff of 19 × 5 = 95,
which is much higher than the 60 he would get for always cooperating. So while from
an inductive standpoint it is rational for player A to cooperate in every round, it will
not be a strategy played by too many businesses in reality. This phenomenon where a
logical inescability is beaten by a plausible argument is called ’Chain Store Paradox’
by Selten.
A similar case of a, as one might call it ”Equilibrium Fallacy” comes with the
Centipede-Game. We will use the example from Binmore[5] where he takes the ex-
ample of a drug trade. We have Bubbles the customer and Avon the drug dealer.
Avon has 100 grains of Heroin, Bubbles has say 100 Dollars. Bubbles does not trust
Avon and Avon does not trust Bubbles (as a rule of thumb, you should neither trust
a criminal nor a junkie, both have very bad reputations), but they need to pull the
deal through since Avon has no use for heroin, except for selling it and Bubbles as a
junkie has no use for money, except for buying heroin. Therefore, we may give the
respective payoffs in the following way:
Figure 2.10.: A sketch of the extensive form of the Centipede-Game
Bubbles’ payoff is given by pi1 = 0.01m+ h and Avon’s is given by pi2 = 0.01h+m
where m stands for money and h for heroin. Bubbles starts first and can either draw
out or play across, which would be passing over 10 Dollars for buying 10 grains of
heroin. If the game is played through, each player receives a payoff of 100. Once a
player draws out, the game is over and everyone goes with the current payoff at hand.
However, on the last move of Avon, he has a payoff of 100.1, while Bubbles has a
payoff of 90. Obviously he would have a better payoff by withdrawing and not playing
the last 10 grains across. Therefore, Bubbles would be better off by not paying the
last 10 dollars and staying at a payoff of 90.1. Iterating backwards, Avon has before
his first move a total payoff of 11 while Bubbles has 0.9. If he plays across however,
his payoff will be 10.9 and Bubbles will be at 10.9 too. Obviously 11 is larger than
10.9 and he would have a higher payoff if he withdraws. Likewise, given this, Bubbles
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would be better off not playing at all and withdrawing in the beginning, meaning that
his best strategy is to play D in his first move, but this would be unsatisfactory for
both.
Summarized with payoff matrices, it would look the following:
Bubbles Avon’s Bubbles Avon’s
decision decision payoff payoff
DRAW - 1 1
Always ACROSS Always-1 ACROSS 90 100.1
Always ACROSS Always ACROSS 100 100
Table 2.2.: Avon and Bubbles payoff after 10 deals
Bubbles Avon’s Bubbles Avon’s
decision decision payoff payoff
DRAW - 1 1
ACROSS DRAW 0.9 11
ACROSS ACROSS 10.9 10.9
Table 2.3.: Avon and Bubbles payoff after 1 deal
or as a payoff-matrix:
P =
(
(1, 1) (1, 1)
(90, 100.1) (100, 100)
)
As we can see, the payoff of this matrix would be the equivalent of case 1c.
2.4. Two Degenerate Strategies
2.4.1. 2a
We have that b12, b21 = 0 and a12 < 0, a21 > 0. Hence y˙ = 0, and we have a continuum
of Nash Equilibria for (0, yˆ) with yˆ ∈ [0, 1].
x˙ = −x(−a12 + (a12 + a21)y)
y˙ = 0
Solving the equation, we get
x(t) = Ce(a12−(a12+a21)y)t
Given that a12 − (a12 + a21)y < 0 and y ∈ [0, 1] we have limt→∞ x(t) = 0 Hence, for
(0, yˆ) we have a continuum of stable and reachable Nash equilibria.
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Figure 2.11.: 2a
2.4.2. 2b
Again, we have the zero payoff matrix for Player 2 as in 2a but for Player 1, the payoffs
are a12 > 0, a21 > 0. This changes the equation to
x˙ = (1− x)(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)+ − x(−a12 + (a12 + a21)y)+
y˙ = 0
With the same computations as above we have stable and reachable Nash equilibria
for (1, y¯) with y¯ > a12
a12+a21
and for (0, yˆ) with yˆ < a12
a12+a21
, while for (xˆ, a12
a12+a21
) xˆ ∈ [0, 1]
we have a continuum of Nash Equilibria that are not stable and not reachable either.
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Figure 2.12.: 2b
2.4.3. 2c
Figure 2.13.: 2c and 2d
We have for each player one degenerate strategy that is dominated, e.g. a12 =
0, a21 < 0 and b12 = 0, b21 < 0. In this case for both players strategy 2 is degenerate
and strategy 1 dominates it. Hence, the equation reads
x˙ = −a21(1− x)y
y˙ = −b21(1− y)x
The Nash Equilibria are (0, 0) and (1, 1). We have for the equilibrium point (1, 1) the
Jacobian matrix (
a21 0
0 b21
)
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which leads to 2 eigenvalues with negative real part and therefore asymptotic stability
at the equilibrium (1, 1). Since x˙, y˙ ≥ 0 we have one Nash Equilibrium (0, 0) that is
not reachable and not stable and one asymptotically stable Nash equilibrium (1, 1).
Given that ω(x, y) ⊆ {(1, 1)} for all interior orbits, by A.8 (1, 1) is also globally
asymptotically stable.
2.4.4. 2d
Again, each player has a degenerate strategy but this time the strategies are dominat-
ing, a12 = 0, a21 > 0 and b12 = 0, b21 > 0 which turns the equation to
x˙ = −a21xy
y˙ = −b21yx
The equilibria are (0, yˆ) and (xˆ, 0) with xˆ, yˆ ∈ [0, 1]. By separation of variables, we
get the constant of motion
b21x = a21y + C
and therefore for either (0, yˆ) or (xˆ, 0), we have a continuum of stable Nash equilibria.
However, no interior orbit leads to (0, 1) and (1, 0), as it is also visible from figure
2.13, and therefore, these 2 points are not reachable, while all other stable equilibria
are.
2.4.5. 2e
Figure 2.14.: 2e
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In this case, one degenerate strategy is dominated and the other one dominant, as
an example if strategy 2 of player 1 is dominant, strategy 1 of player 2 is dominant,
e.g. a12 < 0, a21 = 0 and b12 > 0, b21 = 0. The equation reads
x˙ = a12x(1− y)
y˙ = b12(1− y)(1− x)
which leads us to Nash Equilibria for (xˆ, 1). By finding the Jacobian for all (xˆ, 1), we
get
J(xˆ,1) =
(
a21 0
0 b21
)
which leads us to an eigenvalue smaller 0 and one equal 0 and hence stability.
By separation of variables, we get the level curves
y =
b12
a12
(log(x)− x) + C (2.7)
and by using the Liapunov-function
V (x, y) = x+ y
we have a continuum of stable Nash equilibria for (xˆ, 1) for 0 ≤ xˆ ≤ 1. Further, all
Nash equilibria, except for (0, 1) and (1, 1) are also reachable. (0, 1) is not reachable,
because the only orbit leading to it is on the edge with x = 0, while (1, 1) is a minimum
for (2.7) and therefore no interior orbit leads to it.
2.5. Three Degenerate Strategies
Figure 2.15.: 3
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We only have one case here to look at. We take a21 < 0 and everything else 0, which
leads us to the equation x˙ = −a21y(1 − x) and y˙ = 0 and Nash Equilibria for (xˆ, 0)
and (1, yˆ). We get
x(t) = 1− Cea21yt
and hence a continuum of stable and reachable Nash equilibria at (1, yˆ). Likewise for
y = 0, we also have a set of Nash Equilibria with (xˆ, 0), however no orbit leads to any
of them We can finish this chapter with a final conclusion observed from the results.
Remark 2.6. Every 2×2 Bimatrix game has at least one reachable Nash Equilibrium
for the PD dynamics and every quasi-strict Nash Equilibrium is reachable for the PD
dynamics.
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As with (2.2), the BNN dynamics turns in the 2× 2 case to
x˙ = (1− x)2(a1 − a2)+ − x2(a2 − a1)+
y˙ = (1− y)2(b1 − b2)+ − y2(b2 − b1)+
(3.1)
3.1. The Generic Case
As we can see, the main difference between the two equations (2.2) and (3.1) is with
the quadratic terms. This also makes the case of 0a, 0b rather uninteresting as nothing
really changes. However, we will take a look at cases 0c and 0d as these were also the
most interesting cases for the PD dynamics.
3.1.1. 0c
We use the same payoff matrices (2.1) as we used for the PD dynamics. Hence we
have
x˙ = (1− x)2(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)+ − x2(−a12 + (a12 + a21)y)+
y˙ = (1− y)2(b12 − (b12 + b21)x)+ − y2(−b12 + (b12 + b21)x)+
As we can see, the Nash Equilibrium is also the rest point E = ( b12
b12+b21
, a12
a12+a21
) as it
was for the PD dynamics.
We use again a Liapunov function inspired by Brown, von Neumann [8] and Sandholm
[16]:
V (x, y) = (b12 + b21)((a1 − a¯)2+ + (a2 − a¯)2+)
− (a12 + a21)((b1 − b¯)2+ + (b2 − b¯)2+)
(3.2)
In the first quadrant with x < x¯, x˙ < 0, y < y¯, y˙ > 0 with a2 > a1, b1 > b2 this leads
to
V (x, y) = (b12 + b21)(a2 − a¯)2 − (a12 + a21)(b1 − b¯)2
= (b12 + b21)
2(x(a2 − a1)2)− (a12 + a21)(1− y)2(b1 − b2)2
for the Liapunov function. Therefore we get
V˙ =2(b12 + b21)(a2 − a1)2xx˙+ 2(−(a12 + a21)(b1 − b2)2(1− y)(−y˙)
+ 2(b12 + b21)x
2(a2 − a1)(a2 − a1)• − 2(a12 + a21)(1− y)2(b1 − b2)(b1 − b2)•︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
< 0
and thus global asymptotic stability for the equilibrium E.
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Figure 3.1.: 0c for BNN Dynamics
3.1.2. 0d
By using the same parameters as in case 0d for the PD dynamics, we get
x˙ = (1− x)2(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)+ − x2(−a12 + (a12 + a21)y)+
y˙ = (1− y)2(b12 − (b12 + b21)x)+ − y2(−b12 + (b12 + b21)x)+
We have the same 2 strict Nash Equilibria (0, 1) and (1, 0) which are asymptotically
stable and a mixed Nash Equilibrium in E. Once again, what would be interesting to
know for us would be whether there is any orbit leading to the point E.
We use the same procedure as before and compute in the first quadrant
dx
dy
=
(1− x)2(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)
(1− y)2(b12 − (b12 + b21)x)
This leads us to
(b12 − b21) log(1− x)− b21
(1− x) = −(a12 − a21) log(1− y) +
a21
(1− y) + C
and since E lies on a level curve, we have exactly one orbit leading to it in the first
quadrant. Similarly we can find exactly one orbit leading to E from the third quadrant.
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Figure 3.2.: Battle of the Sexes or 0d for BNN
3.2. One Degenerate Strategy
3.2.1. 1a
We have the same parameters as for the PD dynamics, and therefore (3.1) turns to
x˙ = (1− x)2(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)
y˙ = −b21(1− y)2x
In contrast to the PD dynamics linearization around the equilibrium point E = (1, 1)
does not really work well, since it leads to the 0-matrix and therefore is not hyperbolic
and Hartman-Grobman cannot be applied. We may however use the function
V (x, y) = 2− x− y
as a Liapunov function and we get
V˙ = −x˙− y˙ < 0
for (x, y) 6= (x¯, y¯) and V˙ (x¯, y¯) = 0 and hence E is globally asymptotically stable.
3.2.2. 1b
Now we get to the more interesting parts of the BNN dynamics, especially if we
compare it with the PD dynamics. For case 1b, we have the equations given as
x˙ = −x2(−a12 + (a12 + a21)y)
y˙ = (1− y)2(−b21x) (3.3)
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Figure 3.3.: 1a BNN
As we can see, the equilibrium points are all (0, yˆ) for yˆ ∈ [0, 1]. From the first
look, we will have again stable equilibria on the degenerate edge. However, given that
linearization does not work well with this system, since again the fixed points are not
hyperbolic, we will use a proposition to simplify our system a bit.
Proposition 1. If the function B(x, t) is strictly positive, then the solutions of the
two differential equations x˙ = f(x, t) and x˙ = B(x, t)f(x, t) can be transformed into
each other by a strictly monotonic change in the time scale τ = φ(t)
Proof. Let
x˙ = f(x(t))
y˙ = f(y)B(y) y(t) = x(φ(t))
Then y˙ = x(φ(t))φ˙(t) and for φ˙(t) = B(y(t)) = B(x(φ(t)︸︷︷︸
s
)) = B(x(s)) we get
y˙ = f(y(t))B(y(t))
By multiplying the right hand side of (3.3) with 1
x
we get the new system
x˙ = −x(−a12 + (a12 + a21)y)
y˙ = (1− y)2(−b21)
(3.4)
and the same orbits for x > 0. This leads to the unique equilibrium point E = (0, 1)
with the following Jacobian matrix
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Figure 3.4.: 1b BNN
J(0,1) =
(−a21 0
∗ 0
)
and hence one eigenvalue −a21 < 0 and one eigenvalue 0. By using the Liapunov
function
V (x, y) = 1− y + x
we have
V˙ = −y˙ + x˙ < 0 ∀(x, y) 6= E
and we see that the ω-limit set of each interior orbit is E and we have a stable
equilibrium for E = (0, 1). Therefore and by the Theorem of Liapunov for ω-limits,
we can say that E is the only reachable Nash Equilibrium and all interior orbits
converge to E, while all (0, yˆ) are Nash Equilibria and hence restpoints.
3.2.3. 1c
The system reads
x˙ = (1− x)2(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)+ − x2(−a12 + (a12 + a21)y)+
y˙ = (1− y)2(1− x)b12
Our equilibria are all (1, yˆ) with yˆ ∈
(
a12
a12+a21
, 1
)
. Since we do not have any equilibria
for y < a12
a12+a21
, x˙ < 0, we may only focus on the y ≥ a12
a12+a21
, x˙ > 0. By the same
procedure as for (1b) and Proposition 1, we multiply the right hand side with 1
1−x and
we get
x˙ = (1− x)(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)
y˙ = (1− y)2b12
41
3. BNN Dynamics
This modified system has an equilibrium at E = (1, 1) with the Jacobian matrix
Figure 3.5.: Centipede Game for BNN
J(1,1) =
(−a21 0
∗ 0
)
Using the Liapunovfunction
V (x, y) = 2− x− y
we get stability for E = (1, 1). As in the previous case, this means that we have a set
of Nash Equilibria for (1, yˆ) with a12
a12+a21
≤ yˆ ≤ 1, while E is the only reachable Nash
Equilibrium. The following example will also show that the equilibrium is also perfect.
Example 1. We use the following payoff matrix
P =
(
(0, 0) (−1, 0)
(−1, 2) (0, 0)
)
The payoffs are given by
a1 = −(1− y) a2 = −y
and
b1 = 2(1− x) b2 = 0
respectively. As we can see, player 2 has always a preference for strategy 1 as the
payoff is always higher or equal to 0 while player 1 has given player 2’s preference a
higher payoff for strategy 1. However, given that for player 2 strategy 1 is always a best
reply against the other strategy, by definition of (A.5) (1, 1) is the perfect equilibrium.
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3.2.4. 1d
For the BNN dynamics of the Chain-Store Game, we have
x˙ = (1− x)2(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)+ − x2(−a12 + (a12 + a21y))+
y˙ = −y(1− x)b12
Again, we look at two parts, first for y ≥ a12
a12+a21
and then for y ≤ a12
a12+a21
.
For y ≥ a12
a12+a21
we have
x˙ = (1− x)2(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)
y˙ = −y2(1− x)b12
and Nash Equilibria on (1, yˆ) with yˆ ∈
(
a12
a12+a21
, 1
)
.
By our usual procedure Proposition 1, we get the equivalent system
x˙ = (1− x)(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)
y˙ = −y2b12
As we can see, we don’t have any rest points with y ≥ a12
a12+a21
for this system and
x = 1 is invariant. Hence no orbit converges to any of the Nash Equilibria on the
degenerate edge (1, yˆ ≥ a12
a12+a21
).
Figure 3.6.: Chain-Store Game for BNN dynamics
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For y ≤ a12
a12+a21
we have
x˙ = −x2(−a12 + (a12 + a21y)) < 0
y˙ = −y2(1− x)b12 < 0
and a non-hyperbolic equilibrium at E = (0, 0).
By using the Liapunov function
V (x, y) = x+ y
we see that E is asymptotically stable. Summarizing, all interior orbits converge to
E while we have a set of non-reachable and not stable Nash Equilibria for (1, yˆ) with
yˆ ≥ a12
a12+a21
.
3.3. Two and Three Degenerate Strategies
We leave out the cases 2a,2b and 3 since in each case, the BNN dynamics differs
from the PD dynamics only by a quadratic term for one player and gives us the same
qualitative results as for the PN dynamics. The other 3 cases however turn out quite
interesting.
3.3.1. 2c
Figure 3.7.: 2c BNN
Again we have that for each player one strategy is degenerate and the degenerate
strategy is dominated, e.g. a12 = 0, a21 < 0 and b12 = 0, b21 < 0. In this case for both
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players strategy 2 is degenerate and Strategy 1 dominates it. Hence, the equation
reads
x˙ = −a21y(1− x)2
y˙ = −b21x(1− y)2
where we get two Nash equilibria, one at (0, 0) and one at (1, 1).
We use the Liapunov function L(x, y) = x, which leads us to
L˙(x, y) = x˙ > 0 ∀(x, y) 6= (1, 1) or (0, 0)
and hence we have asymptotic stability for E = (1, 1) and all interior orbits lead to
E, while (0, 0) is not reachable and not stable.
Example 2. In order to show that (0, 0) is dominated, we can look at the following
example with the payoff matrix
P =
(
(0, 0) (0,−1)
(−1, 0) (0, 0)
)
As we can see, the payoffs are given by
a1 = 0 a2 = −y
and
b1 = 0 b2 = −x
respectively. As we can see, strategy 2 for each player is never a best reply to strategy
1, while strategy 1 is always a best reply and hence a perfect equilibrium.
3.3.2. 2d
For a12 = 0, a21 > 0 and b12 = 0, b21 > 0 we have
x˙ = −a21yx2
y˙ = −b21xy2
Again, as in (1) we multiply the right hand side with 1
xy
and get for the new system
x˙ = −a21x
y˙ = −b21y
which leads us to the equilibrium E = (0, 0).
By either using the Jacobian matrix(−a21 ∗
0 −b21
)
which leads us to two negative eigenvalues or by using the Liapunov function L(x, y) =
x we see that E is stable. Here we see that the dynamics differs from the PD dynamics,
as in the PD dynamics we had two edges of reachable equilibria, while now we have
one single reachable Nash Equilibrium.
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Figure 3.8.: 2d BNN
3.3.3. 2e
For one player the degenerate strategy is dominated and for the opposing player the
degenerate strategy is dominant. As an example if strategy 1 of player 1 is dominant,
strategy 2 of player 2 is dominant, e.g. a12 = 0, a21 > 0 and b12 < 0, b21 = 0. The
equation reads
x˙ = −a21(1− y)x2
y˙ = b12(1− x)(1− y)2
We use again Proposition 1 and this time multiply with 1
1−y , and we get
x˙ = −a21x2
y˙ = b12(1− x)(1− y)
As we can see, the only equilibrium point of the new system is E = (0, 1) and by using
the Liapunov function L(x, y) = 1− y + x, we have that
L˙(x, y) = x˙+ y˙ < 0 (x, y) 6= (0, 1)
and therefore E is stable and all interior orbits converge to E. All other Nash Equi-
libria (xˆ, 1) have no interior orbit converging to them.
Once again, the case for the BNN dynamics differs from the PD dynamics and we
have only one reachable Nash Equilibrium.
As a conclusion we may remark the following three results.
Remark 3.4. A pure Nash Equilibrium is asymptotically stable under the BNN dy-
namics if and only if it is strict.
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Figure 3.9.: 2e BNN
Remark 3.5. All perfect equilibria are reachable for the BNN dynamics..
Remark 3.6. Every 2× 2 bimatrix game has at least one reachable Nash Equilibrium
for the BNN dynamics.
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4. Stability through Bendixson-Dulac
Generally, there is a much simpler way in 2 dimensions to prove the existence or non-
existence of periodic orbits and stability of fixed points than by looking for Liapunov
functions, which is through the Poincare´-Bendixson Theorem and the Bendixson-
Dulac Theorem.
Theorem 4.1. (Poincare´-Bendixson)
Suppose that Ω is a nonempty, closed and bounded limit set of an orbit of a
planar system of differential equations that contains no equilibrium point. Then Ω is
a closed orbit.
A proof of this theorem can be found in [11]. In order to predict the absence of pe-
riodic orbits we need the Bendixson-Dulac Theorem which is also known as Bendixson
Theorem or Bendixson-Dulac criteria or method [14].
Theorem 4.2. (Bendixson-Dulac)
Let f : R2 → R2 be C1 and consider the differential equation x˙ = f(x). If divf < 0
throughout the simply connected set Γ then Γ does not contain a closed orbit.
As we can see, we face a problem concerning C1 for both PD and BNN since
neither dynamics is C1. However, both dynamics are Lipschitz continuous and their
orbits are C1 and by finding a way to prove the Gauss-Green-Theorem for Lipschitz-
continuous functions, we may actually use the Bendixson-Dulac Theorem to prove
stability. Fortunately, such a theorem exists, and was proved by Federer[10]. Federer
has given a general proof for higher dimensions. We will use the Theorem for n = 2.
Theorem 4.3. (The Gauss-Green-Federer Theorem)
Let Γ be a compact region of R2 with the positively orientated C1 boundary γ. Then
for any Lipschitz vector field f(x) = (f1(x1, x2), f2(x1, x2))∫
γ
f1dx1 + f2dx2 =
∫
Γ
[
∂f2
∂x1
(x1, x2)− ∂f1
∂x2
(x1, x2)
]
dx2dx1 (4.1)
A proof of this theorem can be found in [10]. However, we will provide a simple
proof of the theorem in a special case where Γ is a rectangle.
First, we need a couple of additional theorems to help us with the proof.
Definition 4.4. (Absolute continuity)
Let I ⊂ R be an interval and f : I → R(or Rn). f is absolutely continuous on I if
for every  > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that whenever a sequence (xk, yk) of pairwise
disjoint subintervals of I satisfies
∑
k |yk − xk| < δ then
∑
k |f(yk)− f(xk)| < .
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Lemma 4.5. Every Lipschitz continuous function f is absolutely continuous.
Proof. For f defined over an interval I = [a, b] and (x, y) ∈ I, we have that
|f(y)− f(x)| < L|y − x|
for a Lipschitz-constant L ∈ R+. For  > 0 let δ = L and
a ≤ x1 ≤ y1 ≤ x2 ≤ y2 ≤ . . . ≤ xn ≤ yn ≤ b
Thus we have that∑
k
|f(yk)− f(xk)| ≤
∑
k
L|yk − xk| = L
∑
k
|yk − xk| < Lδ = 
.
Theorem 4.6. (Fundamental Theorem of Calculus) For F absolutely continuous on I,
we have that F is differentiable almost everywhere on I, f(x) = F ′(x) is defined almost
everywhere and L1 and for all x ∈ I we have F (x) = F (a)+∫ x
a
f(t)dt. Conversely, for
f ∈ L1, F (x) = ∫ x
a
f(t)dt and therefore F is absolutely continuous and F (x)′ = f(x)
almost everywhere.
In order to have a stronger version of the theorem, we may also write down the case
for Lipschitz-continuous functions.
Theorem 4.7. For F Lipschitz on I, we have that F is differentiable almost every-
where on I, f(x) = F ′(x) is L∞ and for all x ∈ I we have F (x) = F (a) + ∫ x
a
f(t)dt.
Conversely, for f ∈ L∞, F is Lipschitz continuous, F (x) = ∫ x
a
f(t)dt and F ′(x) =
f(x) almost everywhere.
Now we prove Theorem 4.3 for a rectangle Γ.
Proof. Let Γ be a rectangle given by the 4 points α1 = (a1, b1), α2 = (a2, b1), α3 =
(a2, b2), α4 = (a1, b2), with a1 ≤ a2 b1 ≤ b2. The boundary of Γ, B is given in 4 parts
by the 4 sides of the rectangle, namely
B1 = α1α2, B2 = α2α3, B3 = α3α4, B4 = α4α1
For B1 we have that x2 = b1 and dx2 = 0 and we integrate over x1. Likewise, we
simplify for B2, B3, B4. Therefore, we get
∫
B
f1dx1 + f2dx2 =
4∑
n=1
∫
Bn
f1dx1 + f2dx2 =
=
∫ a2
a1
f1(x1, b1)dx1 +
∫ b2
b1
f2(a2, x2)dx2 +
∫ a1
a2
f1(x1, b2)dx1 +
∫ b1
b2
f2(a1, x2)dx2
(4.2)
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Figure 4.1.: Rectangle Γ
which leads to∫ a2
a1
[f1(x1, b1)− f1(x1, b2)] dx1 +
∫ b2
b1
[f2(x2, a2)− f2(x2, a1)] dx2 (4.3)
By using the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus (4.7) for each integrand, we get
f1(x1, b1)− f1(x1, b2) =
∫ b1
b2
∂f1
∂x2
(x1, x2)dx2 = −
∫ b2
b1
∂f1
∂x2
(x1, x2)dx2
since f is differentiable almost everywhere. By doing the same as above for the other
integrand, we finally get∫ a2
a1
[f1(x1, b1)− f1(x1, b2)] dx1 +
∫ b2
b1
[f2(x2, a2)− f2(x2, a1)] dx2∫ a2
a1
−
∫ b2
b1
∂f1
∂x2
(x1, x2)dx2dx1 +
∫ b2
b1
∫ a2
a1
∂f2
∂x1
(x1, x2)dx1dx2
which leads us to∫ a2
a1
∫ b2
b1
[
∂f2
∂x1
(x1, x2)dx1dx2 − ∂f1
∂x2
(x1, x2)
]
dx2dx1
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With that proved, we can go on and prove the Bendixson-Dulac Theorem for
Lipschitz-continuous functions.
Theorem 4.8. (Bendixson-Dulac for Lipschitz-continuous functions)
Suppose G is a simply connected domain with piecewise C1 boundary in R2 and f(x)
is a Lipschitz-continuous vector field on G such that divf(x) < 0 almost everywhere.
Then G contains no closed trajectories of x˙ = f(x).
Proof. Suppose there exists a closed orbit γ = {x(t) : t ∈ R} and Γ is its interior.
Following the Gauss-Green-Federer Theorem, we have that∫
Γ
divf(x)d(x1, x2) = ±
∫ T
0
(f2(x(t))x˙1(t)− f1(x(t))x˙2(t))dt
where T is the period of γ. Therefore, the left-hand side is negative, while the right-
hand side is 0, since f1 = x˙1 and f2 = x˙2 and we have a contradiction.
Example 3. For the PD dynamics we have
x˙ = (1− x)(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)+ − x(−a12 + (a12 + a21)y)+
y˙ = (1− y)(b12 − (b12 + b21)x)+ − y(−b12 + (b12 + b21)x)+
Applying the Bendixson-Dulac Theorem, we get
df1
dx1
=
∂x˙
∂x
= −(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)+ − (−a12 + (a12 + a21)y)+
df2
dx2
=
∂y˙
∂y
= −(b12 − (b12 + b21)x)+ − (−b12 + (b12 + b21)x)+
and therefore, since df1
dx1
< 0 almost everywhere except for y = a12
a12+a21
and df2
dx2
< 0
almost everywhere except for x = b12
b12+b21
, no periodic orbit exists. Further, by 4.1, since
the ω-limit set is not a closed orbit, we have an interior fixed point where all orbits
converge to and therefore by A.8, we have a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium.
Example 4. Similarly for the BNN dynamics we have
x˙ = (1− x)2(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)+ − x2(−a12 + (a12 + a21)y)+
y˙ = (1− y)2(b12 − (b12 + b21)x)+ − y2(−b12 + (b12 + b21)x)+
Applying Bendixson-Dulac, we get
df1
dx1
=
∂x˙
∂x
= −2(1− x)(a12 − (a12 + a21)y)+ − 2x(−a12 + (a12 + a21)y)+ < 0
df2
dx2
=
∂y˙
∂y
= −2(1− y)(b12 − (b12 + b21)x)+ − 2y(−b12 + (b12 + b21)x)+ < 0
and we have no periodic orbit. Likewise for the BNN dynamics, the interior fixed point
is globally asymptotically stable.
As a conclusion, we can see that neither the PD dynamics nor the BNN dynamics
allow periodic orbits around the interior equilibrium.
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Liapunov functions
Given that we will not always be lucky enough to find a Liapunov function somewhere,
there is a different way to build such a function L(x, y) fulfilling the requirements for
both PD and BNN dynamics, by using a transformation of variables. We will see the
relationship of that function with the Jacobian matrix of the dynamics and also how
it is related to the Liapunov function of Sandholm. We consider here only the case of
0c, with a12, a21 < 0 and b12, b21 > 0, first for the PD dynamics and later for the BNN
dynamics.
5.1. Constructing a Liapunov function for the
PD-dynamics
We will try to find a quadratic form as Liapunov function
L(u, v) = α1
u2
2
+ β1
v2
2
(5.1)
with α1, β1 > 0 fulfilling the criteria for Liapunov stability. In the first quadrant with
x < x¯ and y < y¯ transforming x and y to u and v, we get
u˙ = (u+ x¯)(a12 + a21)v
v˙ = −(1− y¯ − v)(b12 + b21)u
with u = x− x¯ and v = y − y¯. Hence after the transformation u < 0, v < 0.
We need to find the right parameters for α1 and β1. We have that
L˙(u, v) = α1uu˙+ β1vv˙
= −α1(u+ x¯)(a12 + a21)uv − β1(1− y¯ − v)(b12 + b21)uv
In order for L˙ to be < 0 and given that uv > 0, we need
−α1(u+ x¯)(a12 + a21)− β1(1− y¯ − v)(b12 + b21) < 0
By using x¯ = b12
b12+b21
, y¯ = a12
a12+a21
and D = b12+b21
a12+a21
we have that
−α1(u(a12 + a21) + b12
D
)− β1(a21D − v(b12 + b21) < 0
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Since −α1u(a12 + a21) + β1v(b12 + b21) < 0, we have to find α1 > 0 and β1 > 0 in
such a way, that
−α1 b12
D
= β1a21D
and hence α1 = a21D and β1 = − b12D .
If we look back at (5.1) we see that
u˙ =
b12
D
v v˙ = −a21Du (5.2)
the constants can be found in the Jacobian. For the other 3 quadrants it works
analogously. Further, one can easily calculate that the function is continuous in all
four quadrants and the level sets are closed curves.
The question remaining is about the relationship between the two Liapunov functions.
For (2.5) we have in the first quadrant that
V (u, v) =
1
2
((u+ x¯)(a12 + a21)
2v2 + (1− y¯ − v)(b12 + b21)2u2)
By leaving the mixed terms out, this leads to the following form
V ∗(u, v) =
1
2
(a21(b12 + b21)Du
2 +
b12
D
(a12 + a21)v
2)
where we can see that
V ∗(u, v) =
1
2
(y¯(b12 + b21)
2u2 + x¯(a12 + a21)
2v2)
and
L(u, v) =
1
2
(y¯(b12 + b21)u
2 − x¯(a12 + a21)v2)
hence V ∗ = −(a12 + a21)(b12 + b21)L
5.2. Liapunov Function for the BNN-dynamics
We use a similar trick for the BNN-dynamics. Again, we look for a function
L(u, v) = α1
u2
2
+ β1
v2
2
(5.3)
that fulfills the criteria for Liapunov stability. As we know, one cannot linearize the
BNN dynamics, so trying to find a relationship with the Jacobian makes little sense.
However, we will still use the same transformation of variables as in the previous case
with
u = x− x¯
v = y − y¯
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This turns our dynamics in the first quadrant to
u˙ = −(u+ x¯)2(a12 + a21)v
v˙ = −(1− y¯ − v)2(b12 + b21)u
(5.4)
Therefore, we get
L˙(u, v) = α1uu˙+ β1vv˙
= −α1u(u+ x¯)2(a12 + a21)v − β1(1− y¯ − v)2(b12 + b21)u
= −uv(α1(u+ b12
b12 + b21
)2(a12 + a21) + β1(
a21
a12 + a21
− v)2(b12 + b21))
Given that −uv < 0 we have to show that the bracket is > 0. Therefore we say
α1(a12+a21)(u
2+2
b12
b12 + b21
u+
b212
(b12 + b21)2
)+β1(b12+b21)(
a221
(a12 + a21)2
−2 a21
a12 + a21
v+v2) > 0
For u, v ≤ 1 we have that
α1(a12 + a21)(u
2 + 2
b12
b12 + b21
u) + β1(b12 + b21)(−2 a21
a12 + a21
v + v2) > 0
because since α1(a12 + a21) < 0 we need to look at
u2 + 2
b12
b12 + b21
u = u(u+ 2
b12
b12 + b21
)
and with u + 2 b12
b12+b21
never smaller than 0 (say u + 2 b12
b12+b21
< 0 then u < −2 b12
b12+b21
and therefore x < − b12
b12+b21
which contradicts x > 0) we only need to look at
α1(a12 + a21)
b212
(b12 + b21)2
+ β1(b12 + b21)
a221
(a12 + a21)2
= 0
which equals
α1
b12
D
x¯ = −β1a21y¯D
which leads to
α1 = a21y¯D β1 = −b12
D
x¯
It works analogously for the other 3 quadrants. Overall, the Liapunov function is
given by
L(u, v) = λ1y¯D
u2
2
+ λ2
x¯
D
v2
2
(5.5)
with λ1 and λ2 depending on the quadrants. Again, by calculations, one can reach
the conclusion that the function is continuous and the level sets are closed curves.
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6. Conclusion and Further Outlook
Conclusion
We have studied all cases of 2× 2 games for the PD and BNN dynamics. Overall we
may summarize with these main results.
• For both dynamics, just like for all innovative dynamics, the rest points or
stationary points are equal to the Nash Equilibria.
• For the PD dynamics all quasi-strict Nash Equilibria are reachable. This behav-
ior bears similarities with the Replicator dynamics(see [9], [12]).
• For the BNN dynamics the perfect equilibria are reachable, similar as in the
case for the Best-response dynamics [9], [12]. This is quite surprising as from
an intuitive viewpoint by looking at the equations, one might suggest that the
BNN dynamics would behave more like the Replicator dynamics, while the PD
dynamics would behave more like the Best-response dynamics.
• For both dynamics a pure Nash Equilibrium is asymptotically stable iff it is
strict.
• Both dynamics do not have periodic orbits around interior equilibria.
Outlook
Several questions arise from the work and are left open. The obvious question would
be about the behavior of the dynamics for 2 × n games. Obviously, the number of
equivalence classes of 2× n games is much larger than the number of 2× 2 games so
it would lead to a more extensive analysis. Berger proves in [2] the convergence of BR
dynamics to equilibria in 2×n games. It is tempting to conjecture that the same holds
for BNN and PD dynamics. What would be of further interest in higher dimensions is
the behavior of the perfect and quasi-strict Nash Equilibria and whether they would
still be reachable or not for the BNN- and PD dynamics respectively.
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A. Additional Definitions and
Theorems
Game Theory
We start with some definitions and results from Game Theory.
Remark A.1. The best reply or best response is the strategy(or strategies) which
produces the most favorable outcome for a player, taking other players’ strategies as
given.
Definition A.2. (Nash Equilibrium)
Let (A,B) be a Bimatrix game. E = (xˆ, yˆ) is a Nash Equilibrium(NE), if
xˆAyˆ ≥ xAyˆ ∀x ∈ ∆n
yˆBxˆ ≥ yBxˆ ∀y ∈ ∆m
(A.1)
Definition A.3. (Strict Nash Equilibrium)
A Nash Equilibrium is considered strict if it is the unique best-reply to itself i.e. for
(x, y) ∈ ∆n ×∆m
xˆAyˆ > xAyˆ ∀x 6= xˆ
yˆBxˆ > yBxˆ ∀y 6= yˆ
Definition A.4. (Quasi-strict Nash Equilibrium)
A Nash Equilibrium (x, y) is considered quasi-strict if not used strategies are inferior
replies, i.e. for xi = 0, i is not a best reply to y and yj = 0 implies j is not a best
response to x.
Definition A.5. (Perfect Equilibrium)
zˆ is a perfect equilibrium if for a sequence zk ∈ int(∆n ×∆m) zk → zˆ, k → ∞ and zˆ
is a best reply against zk ∀k = 1, 2, . . . .
Ordinary Differential Equations
We will look at results for Ordinary Differential Equations given by x˙ = f(x) with the
solution x(t).
Definition A.6. (ω-limit)
The ω-limit of x is the set of all accumulation points of x(t), for t → +∞: ω(x) =
{y ∈ Rn : x(tk)→ y for some sequence tk → +∞}
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Remark A.7. If the orbit remains in some compact set K, then every sequence x(tk)
must admit accumulation points and ω(x) cannot be empty.
Definition A.8. (Stability and Asymptotic Stability)
A rest point z of an ODE x˙ = f(x) is said to be stable, if for any neighborhood U of
z, there exists a neighborhood W of z such that any orbit through W remains in U
for all t > 0.
It is said to be asymptotically stable if, in addition, such orbits converge to z, (i.e.
x(t)→ z ∀x ∈ W ).
The set of points x with x(t) → z as t → +∞ is called the basin of attraction of z.
If z is asymptotically stable then it is an open invariant set. If it is the whole state
space, or at least its interior, then z is said to be globally asymptotically stable.
Definition A.9. (Liapunov’s Theorem for ω-limits) Let x˙ = f(x) be a time-independent
ODE defined on some subset G of Rn. Let V : G→ R be continuously differentiable.
If for some solution x(t) the derivative V˙ of the map t → V (x(t)) satisfies the in-
equality V˙ ≤ 0 (or V˙ ≥ 0) for all t ≥ 0, then ω(x)⋂G is contained in the set{
x ∈ G : V˙ (x) = 0
}
.
Definition A.10. (Reachability) An equilibrium point E = (x¯, y¯) is reachable under
a given dynamics if there exists an interior orbit (x(t), y(t)) of the dynamics with
x(t)→ x¯ and y(t)→ y¯ for t→∞.
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